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Abstract 
Interventions with offenders have a normative layer as well as a scientific basis and 
therefore it is not possible to quarantine ethical questions from discussions of best 
practice. My aim in this paper is to provide an expanded ethical canvass from which 
to approach correctional practice with offenders. The cornerstone of this broader 
ethical perspective will be the concept of human dignity and its protection by human 
rights norms and theories. I also explore the relationship between responses to crime 
and offender rehabilitation based on an enriched theory of punishment that is 
sensitive to offenders’ moral equality and their attendant rights. 
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Introduction 
Criminal acts are by definition illegal and are almost always ethically unacceptable 
because of the unjustified harm intentionally inflicted on innocent parties by persons 
who are held accountable (Kleinig, 2008). It is impossible to dissociate the normative 
components in an analysis of crime from a description of the specific actions 
committed by individuals and their impact upon other people. This is because 
concepts inextricably embedded within the discourse of crime and law such as “harm” 
or “justification” are deeply value laden and thick with normative and factual 
associations (Duff, 2001).  However, the fusion of the normative and factual facets of 
crime extends well beyond its definition and law enforcement considerations. We 
have recently argued that offender rehabilitation or reintegration is an evaluative and 
capacity building process because of its emphasis on both practitioners' and offenders‟ 
practical reasoning (Ward & Maruna, 2007; Ward & Nee, 2009). Practical reasoning 
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is a form of rationality that involves evaluating goals and the values that underlie 
them, and formulating an action plan that integrates individuals‟ goals and helps to 
achieve desired outcomes in an efficient manner (Ward & Nee, 2009).  One way of 
conconceptualising correctional intervention programs is as systematic attempts to 
provide offenders with the requisite internal and external resources to implement 
plans likely to result in better lives. The evaluative component of rehabilitation is 
evident in its concern to reduce risk of further reoffending by reorienting individuals' 
value judgments from offence supportive goods to ones that are personally 
meaningful and socially acceptable. The capacity building process involves the 
application of psychological and social interventions to facilitate the acquisition of 
capabilities and opportunities to secure socially endorsed outcomes valued by 
offenders. This component of rehabilitation is based upon the facts of human 
functioning and the technology of skill acquisition. 
Once it is acknowledged that interventions with offenders have a normative layer as 
well as a scientific basis it is not possible to quarantine ethical questions from 
discussions of best practice. It is apparent that in the psychological literature on 
offender rehabilitation the level of ethical debate has been disappointingly superficial 
and oriented around procedural matters such as duty to warn, conflicting roles, and 
risk prediction and management (e.g., Bush,  Connell, & Denny, 2006; Haag, 2006). 
There has been relatively little analysis of such important topics as offenders‟ moral 
status, the relationship between punishment and rehabilitation, or the degree to which 
offenders retain their basic human rights (Ward & Birgden, 2007; Ward & Salmon, 
2009). This neglect cannot be dismissed as essentially benign in terms of its effects on 
assessment and program delivery. I propose that it is a critical oversight that threatens 
the ethical integrity of correctional practice and any empirically supported 
interventions that are based on unexamined and arguably unacceptable assumptions 
about what is ethically permissible in the realm of practice.  
My aim in this paper is to provide an expanded ethical canvass from which to 
approach correctional practice with offenders. The cornerstone of this broader ethical 
perspective will be the concept of human dignity and its protection by human rights 
norms and theories. I will also explore the relationship between responses to crime 
and offender rehabilitation based on an enriched theory of punishment that is sensitive 
to offenders‟ moral equality and their attendant rights. In brief, first I analyze the 
concept of human dignity and arrive at a conception that respects the basic conditions 
of a human life and also stresses the importance of individual autonomy. Second, I 
outline the key features of human rights and their relevance for practitioners in the 
correctional domain. Third, I examine the relationship between the two normatively 
distinct but overlapping frameworks of punishment and rehabilitation. Finally, I 
sketch out some overall implications for intervention arising from the concepts of 
dignity, human rights, and punishment.  
Human Dignity and Vulnerable Agency 
The concept of human dignity is an ancient moral idea concerned with the intrinsic 
value and universal moral equality of human beings. Because of their inherent dignity 
human beings are assumed to possess equal moral status and therefore are expected to 
receive equal consideration in matters that directly affect their core interests.  The 
equal moral standing of each person within a moral community means that every 
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person is entitled to make specific claims against other members of the moral 
community, and in turn is expected to acknowledge his or her own obligations to 
acknowledge others respective legitimate claims. In essence, the concept of dignity 
designates the moral worth or value of all human beings although the meaning of this 
term has changed considerably since its origins just over two thousand years ago 
(Sulmasy, 2007).   
The pivotal role of the concept of human dignity in regulating human relationships 
and coordinating competing interests is evident in most major moral theories and 
various human rights treaties such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR – United Nations, 1948).  The preamble of the UDHR asserts that, 
“recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all 
members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the 
world.” The UDHR was followed by the European Convention on Human Rights 
(came into force in 1953; Smit & Snacken, 2009) and two international covenants in 
1966 (the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights) that provided more detail on the 
various articles outlined in the original UN declaration ( Freeman, 2002). There are 
also references to human dignity in the various articles of the UDHR and in the other 
treaties, as well as in the many books and commentaries on these important human 
rights documents. It is apparent that from the standpoint of the authors of the UDHR, 
human dignity is a core moral idea rather than primarily a legal concept and therefore 
theoretically grounds or justifies laws and political norms that are designed to protect 
fundamental human needs and interests (Churchill, 2006).  
While it is commonly accepted that dignity refers to human worth, the term has been 
conceptualized in various ways by modern theorists (Beyleveld & Brownsword, 2001; 
Malpas & Lickiss, 2007).  More specifically, dignity has been defined in terms of the 
minimal living conditions required for an acceptable level of existence (Nussbaum, 
2006). For example, a lifestyle characterised by inadequate drinking water, lack of 
nutritious food, a polluted environment, and a deficit of caring relationships is likely 
to slip beneath the minimal threshold of a dignified human life.  Another attempt to 
define dignity states that a person has dignity when he or she is free to form his or her 
own intentions and is able to act in accordance with them without interference 
(Driver, 2006).  By way of contrast, some theorists have proposed that individuals 
have dignity if they live their lives in accordance with the norms of their community 
and its practices and traditions (Beyleveld & Brownsword, 2001).  Such a viewpoint 
is more constraining than that allowed by a conception of dignity based on autonomy. 
For example, certain actions or lifestyles may be evaluated as undignified and 
therefore ethically unacceptable if they are believed to violate cherished community 
sexual or social norms (Beyleveld & Brownsword, 2001). A final conception of 
dignity evident in the literature is based upon the idea that dignity depends on being a 
flourishing member of a kind.  According to this standpoint, individuals have dignity 
if they are fulfilling themselves as human beings and their unique abilities are fully 
developed (Miller, 2007; Nussbaum, 2006).  
The above conceptions of dignity only represent a few of the ways this important 
concept has been unpacked. In a seminal analysis Beyleveld and Brownsword (2001) 
set out to unify the multiple meanings of dignity by making a distinction between 
dignity as empowerment and dignity as constraint. The notion of dignity as 
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empowerment stresses the importance of uncoerced choice and freedom of movement 
for human beings as they go about their lives.  The emphasis placed on empowerment 
points to the value of self-governance and the capacity and opportunity of individuals 
to actively and freely pursue their self-selected goals without interference from others. 
The second aspect of dignity acknowledges its links with constraints on the way 
people are treated and also on how they behave.  According to this viewpoint, people 
only retain their dignity if they follow the norms of their community and do not act in 
ways that cast shame or ridicule on themselves or others. An example of such social 
constraints is a recent legal case in France where dwarf throwing was outlawed 
despite protests from the dwarf in question that he wished to participate in such 
contests (Beyleveld & Brownsword, 2001).  
To take stock, relying on the analysis by Beyleveld and Brownsword, the dignity of 
human beings is located in their capacity to formulate and pursue their interests in the 
world without unjustified interference by other people. However, individuals' own 
judgements are not the only determinants of what constitutes a dignified life and 
sometime people can act in ways that are freely chosen that unfortunately diminish 
their status as human beings. An example in the correctional domain might be where 
offenders agree to harsh and humiliating interventions because they do not believe 
they are worthy of better treatment.  A notable implication of a concept of dignity 
based on empowerment and constraint is that it points to the vulnerabilities of human 
beings because of their nature as embodied, social animals.  In order to be able to act 
in pursuit of personally selected goals and their translation into plans of action, basic 
needs have to be meet as well and educational opportunities and social scaffolding 
provided.  In other words, human beings require certain primary goods and 
opportunities to be able to act in ways worthy of their intrinsic value. Because of their 
critical role both in helping people lead a life of dignity and ensuring they have the 
necessary capabilities to function according to their inherent dignified nature, these 
resources are viewed as entitlements and therefore are protected by fundamental 
moral and legal rights (human rights – see below).   
In conclusion, individuals‟ inherent dignity grounds their authority to claim basic 
entitlements to resources and also to non-interference from others in pursuit of 
justified goals. Alternatively, and crucially, because all people possess equal dignity 
each has a corresponding obligation to respond appropriately to other people‟s 
legitimate claims and wishes.  It is important to emphasize that because respect for all 
individuals ultimately stems from their inherent dignity it cannot be ethically 
justifiably be taken from them through the actions of the state or by other people. 
Darwell‟s (2006) distinction between recognition respect and appraisal respect nicely 
captures the inviolate nature of dignity.  Recognition respect is based upon the 
assumed moral equality and standing within a moral community of all individuals. All 
people have an equal voice in matters that affect their core interests and there is 
agreement that accountability goes hand in hand with entitlements to certain levels of 
treatment and functioning. On the other hand, the level of appraisal respect accorded 
persons ought to reflect their actions towards others and the degree to which they are 
evaluated as morally praiseworthy or blameworthy at any particular time. The key 
point is that recognition respect modulates the way appraisal respect is translated into 
ethical responses to unacceptable actions. For example, punishments ought to be 
implemented in a manner that fully acknowledges a person‟s inherent dignity, and 
should never be delivered in a demeaning or humiliating way.  
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Human Rights 
The above discussion of human dignity has demonstrated its foundational role in 
locating the intrinsic value or worth of human beings in their capacity for action and 
in achieving a certain level of well-being. A significant insight arising from my 
analysis is that the concept of dignity is necessarily connected to people‟s relationship 
to others within their community, and arguably to the wider human race.  The 
dependence of dignity on interconnectedness emerges because a capacity for action 
and ability to achieve acceptable levels of well-being only makes sense, and is only 
possible, within a social network. A second implication is that ethical issues arise 
when there are conflicting interests, and a major function of ethical norms is to 
establish practices that effectively coordinate the diverse, and often competing, 
interests of individual agents (Driver, 2006). The implication for correctional 
practitioners is that all offenders are entitled to be treated in ways that reflect this 
inherent dignity, or to put it in Darwell‟s language, the fact that offenders have 
behaved unethically and merit punishment does not mean they forfeit their status as 
moral equals. In other words, any response to crime or interventions that occur while 
individuals are within the criminal justice system ought to be delivered in ways that 
ensure recognition respect is evident.  
 
What are human rights? 
While establishing the crucial role of dignity in ethical thought is an important first 
step in developing an enriched ethical framework for correctional practitioners, it is 
not sufficient. What is needed is the specification of norms that are designed to 
protect the empowerment and well-being requirements that comprise dignity. Human 
rights are an important set of norms that were designed with this purpose in mind and 
can usefully be regarded as protective capsules.  The relationship between values and 
human rights is well articulated by Michael Freeden (1991) who argues that: 
 
…a human right is a conceptual device, expressed in linguistic form, that 
assigns priority to certain human or social attributes regarded as essential to 
the adequate functioning of a human being; that is intended to serve as a 
protective capsule for those attributes; and that appeal for deliberate action to 
ensure such protection. (p. 7) 
 
Freeden‟s definition points to the fact that human rights are intended to function as 
protective capsules, to provide a defensive zone around individuals so that they can 
get on with the business of leading good and meaningful lives. That is, a life that is 
chosen by them and that involves the unfolding of personal projects embodying their 
particular commitments.  Summarising their key properties, Nickels (2007) asserts 
that human rights:  
 are universal and extend to all peoples of the world;  
 are moral norms that provide strong reasons for granting individuals 
significant benefits;  
 exert normative force through both national and international institutions;  
 are evident in both specific lists of rights and at the level of abstract 
values; and  
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 set minimum standards of living rather than depicting an ideal world.  
The possession of human rights by individuals will not necessarily guarantee that they 
will achieve rich and satisfying lives; arguably they are necessary not sufficient 
conditions for a good life. Rather, the ability to claim certain fundamental 
entitlements for core goods from others and to have these entitlements accepted is 
likely to result in the acquisition of the basic capabilities required to shape a life that 
is valued and one‟s own. Human rights both reflect and confer moral status and 
remind governments, agencies and other people that consider rights holders‟ essential 
interests when pursuing outcomes that are likely to harm or benefit those individuals.  
How are human rights defined? In essence, a human right is a claim right legitimately 
possessed by persons because they are human beings (Griffin, 2008; Morsink, 2009, 
Orend, 2002).  A claim right reflects the duties another person or agency has to the 
claimant to provide specific goods such as essential materials for survival or to allow 
the claimant to engage in certain actions (i.e., non-interference in the rights-holder‟s 
affairs).  Following on from this analysis a claim right has five key elements: a rights-
holder, the assertion of a claim, an object of the claim (e.g., education), the recipient 
of the claim (i.e., duty-bearer), and the grounds for the claim.  Human rights have a 
metaphysical basis in the nature of human beings and therefore conceptually exclude 
secondary characteristics such as social class, professional group, culture, racial 
group, gender, or sexual orientation. In other words, individuals hold human rights 
simply because they are members of the human race and as such are considered to be 
entitled to a life characterized by a certain level of dignity.  As stated earlier, a 
dignified life is one characterised by personal choice and a certain level of well-being. 
In order to achieve such a life it is necessary that certain well-being and freedom 
goods are available to the person (Gewirth, 1996; Griffin, 2008; Miller, 2007).  
It is possible to trace the origins of human rights from middle-eastern legal codes to 
their modern manifestation in natural rights inspired declarations such as the French 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen (Donnelly, 2003).  Eventually the 
enlightenment versions culminated in the publication of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights in 1948 with its focus more on human dignity than natural law (United 
Nations, 1948).  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) consists of a 
preamble expressing the inherent dignity of human beings and 30 articles specifying 
rights to objects such as freedom from torture, security of the person, a fair trial and 
due process, right to own property, freedom to and from discrimination, freedom to 
marry, the right to work, and religious freedom (United Nations, 1948). One difficulty 
with the the UDHR is that it is simply a list of relatively specific claims for access to 
goods or non-interference from others (negative rights). The Canadian philosopher 
Brian Orend (2002) has usefully conceptually collapsed the articles of UDHR into 
five clusters, each cluster associated with a particular human rights object. The five 
types of goods determined by Orend are as follows: Personal freedom, material 
subsistence, personal security, elemental equality, and social recognition. 
Justification of human rights 
The question of how to justify human rights remains.  In my view the most powerful 
theoretical defences of human rights are universal in nature and go beyond legalistic 
conceptions rooted in power politics. Instead, the aim is to identify aspects of human 
functioning that are considered to be particularly important and to present an 
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argument for anchoring human rights and their value in these features. A number of 
theorists have presented justification of human rights based on needs or 
agency/personhood concepts, arguing that such ideas reliably extend the reach of 
human rights to all persons within a society and those living in different countries. 
James Griffin (2008) proposes that human rights can be grounded in three core 
features of persons: (a) autonomy or the ability to make important decisions for 
oneself, (b) possession of a set of minimal resources and capabilities, such as 
education and health, and (c) liberty, where other people do not prevent someone 
against their will from applying their conception of a worthwhile life (p. 33).  
Relatedly, Alan Gewirth (1981; 1996) asserts that human rights function to protect the 
fundamental conditions necessary for people to operate as moral agents. That is, as 
individuals capable of formulating their own personal projects and realizing them in 
their lives. According to Gewirth, individuals have rights to whatever is necessary to 
achieve the purposes of their actions because without such guarantees, they may not 
be able to effectively act at all (i.e., will be unable to achieve valued outcomes). A 
third important rights theorist, David Miller (2007), argues that human rights are 
justified by their ability to facilitate the satisfaction of people‟s intrinsic human needs.  
Miller defines intrinsic needs as “…those items or conditions it is necessary for a 
person to have if she is to avoid being harmed” (p. 179).  
All three theorists claim that what holds for any individuals with respect to their rights 
also extends to all other people and that in any community the rights and obligations 
of every person needs to be respected and incorporated into social and political 
decisions (Ward & Birgden, 2007; Ward & Langlands, 2008).  According to the 
above theorists, human rights impose both positive and negative duties on states and 
other people, which they are ethically obligated to meet within certain practical 
constraints (e.g., they have the resources and/or abilities to meet the claim). 
Furthermore, when there are conflicting interests and demands arising from 
individuals‟ human right claims, it is necessary to evaluate each claim with respect to 
its importance and to arrive at a solution that seeks to achieve a balance between the 
entitlements of all individuals concerned. Sometimes, it may not be possible to satisfy 
all just entitlements and the respective duties may be prioritized according to their 
degree of need or urgency. The crucial point is that it is ethically obligatory to engage 
in a process that acknowledges the inherent dignity and associated rights of all 
members of the moral community and not to arbitrarily dismiss or seek to strip away 
an individual‟s basic entitlements. Theorists such as Griffin, Miller, and Gewirth 
argue that human rights are designed to protect the essential interests of all human 
beings: needs, capacities, and experiences that if instantiated respect their dignity as 
persons and if violated result in diminished and broken lives. The breaching of human 
rights occurs when individuals are treated primarily as means to other people‟s goals 
rather than as valued agents themselves.  An example of this is when individuals from 
a certain ethnic group are denied basic health services because of the expense to the 
state and yet are exploited as sources of cheap labour. A correctional example could 
be when sex offenders are detained indefinitely in special hospitals because they are 
considered a high risk for future offending (Vess, 2009). 
In summary, human rights create a space within which individuals can lead at least 
minimally worthwhile lives that allow them to maintain a basic sense of human 
dignity. Human rights are a relatively narrow set of rights and are only intended to 
protect the internal and external conditions necessary for a minimally worthwhile life. 
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I agree with human rights theorists who assert that the core requirements of 
personhood and agency constitute these basic conditions and therefore such 
conditions ought to be provided, and defended by the state, relevant agencies, and all 
citizens. I will consider the correctional practice implications of human rights in the 
final section of the paper. At this point I would respond to individuals who argue that 
offenders have forfeited their human rights by replying that if such rights are inherent 
to human beings, they cannot legitimately be taken away. And if the purpose of 
human rights is to ensure that the inherent dignity of all human beings is maintained 
then it follows that offenders‟ entitlements to agency and well-being should be safe 
guarded to the fullest degree possible (Lippke, 2002). Any restrictions upon their 
liberty and conditions of living need to be carefully argued for and not simply be 
assumed to be ethically acceptable. Furthermore, punishment practices ought to be 
implemented accordance with the dignity and rights of offenders and not delivered in 
a manner that is demeaning and dehumanising (Lazarus, 2004; Lippke, 2002). 
Punishment and Rehabilitation 
To summarize my argument so far, I have suggested that the concept of human 
dignity is the ethical foundation for human rights protocols and theories. A dignified 
human life is one that allows a person to make fundamental choices concerning his or 
her life goals and also addresses core well-being needs. Human right theories provide 
the justification for specific treaties and other normative mechanisms that are 
designed to protect the core conditions required for a dignified life. Because offenders 
are human beings it follows they hold human rights and therefore ought to be treated 
in accordance with the basic values and the specific norms evident in human rights 
protocols. It now remains to examine the ethical implications of punishment and its 
relationship to offender rehabilitation. In the following section I argue that the only 
ethically justified theory of punishment is some kind of restorative or communicative 
theory, such as the theory developed by Antony Duff (2001). One of the major 
reasons this theory is ethically justifiable is that it advocates treating offenders with 
respect and also acknowledges their right to be reconciled with the community 
following completion of a sentence. Punishment requires ethical justification as it is 
commonly accepted that harming another person without sound reasons is wrong. 
I do not have space in this paper to critically examine the other two main theories of 
punishment, consequential and nonconsequential theories (for a comprehensive 
analysis see Ward & Salmon, 2009). But briefly, consequential theories of 
punishment are based on an evaluation of the total amount of happiness or good 
obtained through punishment practices while non consequential theories tend to focus 
on the intrinsic rightness of inflicting proportionate harm on someone who has 
harmed others (Boonin, 2008; Golash, 2005). A problem with the former is that it can 
involve treating offenders as simply means to advance the goals of communities (e.g., 
reduced risk) while the latter may ignore legitimate well-being needs of offenders. 
Both theories run the risk of failing to acknowledge the inherent dignity of offenders 
and the fact that moral agents are embedded within communities to whom they are 
accountable but also against which they have legitimate claims to primary goods such 
as the possibility of social reentry.  
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What is Punishment? 
Essentially state inflicted punishment in the criminal justice system involves the 
intentional imposition of harm on an individual who has unjustifiably harmed a fellow 
citizen (Bennett, 2008; Duff, 2001).  More specifically, punishment in the criminal 
justice system has five necessary elements (Boonin, 2008):  punishment practices are 
authorized by the state, intentional, reprobative (they express disapproval or censure), 
retributive (they follow a wrongful act committed by the offender) and harmful (they 
result in suffering, a burden, or deprivation to the offender). 
There are three major reasons why correctional practitioners are unable to avoid 
addressing the ethical challenges posed by the institution of punishment. First, it is 
possible that psychologists, social workers, therapists, and program staff may work 
within institutions that are unduly harsh and abusive. Second, assumptions concerning 
the justification of punishment are likely to be reflected in the specific penal policies 
and practices embedded in the criminal justice system and shape professional tasks 
and roles. For example, the emphasis on risk assessment and management currently 
evident in the correctional systems throughout the western world is arguably 
conceptually dependent upon a consequential ethical theory (Ward & Salmon, 2009).  
Third, punishment and rehabilitation practices are distinct but overlapping normative 
frameworks (Ward & Salmon, 2009). Punishment is a response to crime based on 
ethical values while rehabilitation aims to facilitate social reentry and is based on 
prudential (well-being) values. However, some aspects of what have been called 
treatment may in fact be punishment given their intended effects (Glaser, 2003; 
Levenson & D‟Amora, 2005). For example, cognitive restructuring in sex offender 
intervention programs is partly designed to cause offenders to feel remorse and take 
responsibility, arguably an aspect of punishment. The point is that unless practitioners 
are able to justify punishment then such interventions are unethical and ought to be 
avoided. 
These examples indicate that the justification of punishment is of relevance and 
ethical concern for all practitioners. It is not possible to insulate the role of program 
deliverers from the ethical issues associated with punishment. Therefore, correctional 
practitioners ought to endorse punishment practices external and internal to their 
practice by reference to an acceptable punishment theory. In my view, any such 
theory ought to be responsive to the inherent dignity and associated human rights of 
offenders. I will now briefly describe the communicative theory of punishment which 
I argue meets these requirements. 
Communicative theory of punishment 
Communicative justifications of punishment have their basis in a liberal 
communitarian view of political and moral public institutions (Duff, 2001). According 
to Antony Duff (2001), communicative theories of punishment have a relationship 
focus and as such insist that the rights of all stakeholders in the criminal justice 
system, including offenders, are taken into account when constructing theories of 
punishment.  Because all individuals are presumed to have equal moral status, 
offenders are viewed as fellow members of a normative community (i.e., offenders 
are viewed as “one of us”) and therefore are bound and protected by the community‟s 
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public values of autonomy, freedom, privacy and pluralism. Duff argues that these 
values are those of a liberal democracy where all human beings are considered to 
possess inherent dignity and therefore have equal moral standing within the 
community.  A major assumption of communicative perspectives is that punishment 
practices ought to be inclusive of offenders rather than involving some type of social 
exclusion or quarantining. Duff asserts that while individuals who have committed 
public wrongs ought to be held accountable they should be treated with respect 
because of their moral status in the process of administering punishment. Therefore, 
he proposes that due to their equal moral status any punishment inflicted upon 
offenders should seek to persuade rather than coerce them to take responsibility for 
their crimes. Furthermore, because offenders are viewed as fellow members of the 
moral community it is accepted that the primary aim of punishment is to communicate 
to them the wrongness of their actions. The aim of this process of communication is 
give wrongdoers an opportunity to redeem themselves and ultimately to be reconciled 
to the community. Duff argues that hard treatment such as imprisonment is obligatory 
within the criminal justice system because it draws offenders‟ attention to the 
seriousness of the wrongs committed and appropriately expresses social disapproval. 
Crimes are regarded as violations of community norms that the offender as a fellow 
moral agent is assumed to endorse as well.  There are three aims integral to the 
institution of punishment from the standpoint of Duff‟s communicative theory: 
secular repentance, reform, and reconciliation through the imposition of sanctions. 
The communitarian orientation of this theoretical position is nicely captured in his 
statement that punishment is a “a burden imposed on an offender for his crime, 
through which, it is hoped, he will come to repent his crime, to begin to reform 
himself, and thus reconcile himself with those he has wronged” (Duff, 2001, p. 106).   
Practice Implications 
As a theory of punishment, Duff‟s communicative theory has the virtue of being 
inclusive rather than exclusive in its ethical reach. The interests of all relevant 
stakeholders affected by crime are taken into account in the implementation of 
punishment. The offender is regarded as an equal moral agent and treated with the 
respect and dignity this status entails. A significant feature of communicative theories 
of punishment is that crime is conceptualized as a community responsibility rather 
than simply an individual one.  While offenders are held accountable to the 
community their core interests are not neglected. Relatedly, victims are not ethically 
required to forgive offenders but do owe them a meaningful opportunity to be 
reintegrated within the community once they have served their sentences. Thus, the 
community is obligated to actively help offenders in the process of integration by the 
necessary internal and external resources such as education, work training, 
accommodation, and access to social networks.   
From a practice viewpoint, secular repentance takes the moral agency of offenders 
seriously and emphasizes the importance of their acknowledging the unjustified harm 
they have inflicted on members of the community. The reform strand of the 
communicative theory of punishment refers to the desirability of offenders becoming 
motivated to change themselves and their behavior for ethical as well as prudential 
reasons.  The realization that they have unjustifiably caused other people to suffer will 
hopefully lead to a firm resolution to do what is necessary to becomes law abiding 
citizens. Finally, the reconciliation strand of the communicative theory of punishment 
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expresses the desire of both offenders and communities for reconciliation following 
repentance and efforts at reform. There are two aspects to the process of reconciliation 
that are practically relevant: the offender‟s obligation to apologize and make 
appropriate reparations to victims and possibly other people affected by his or her 
crimes, and the community‟s obligation to help the offender reintegrate back into the 
community following the completion of a sentence.  
Practice Implications 
I will now briefly outline some of the major implications for practitioners arising from 
the preceding discussion. I will concentrate the discussion on five points. First, a 
rehabilitation approach that focuses entirely on risk management elements may 
violate the inherent dignity and rights of offenders. Second, conflict between the 
rights of offenders and the rights of others should not always be resolved in favour of 
the latter‟s interests. Third, the two core aspects of a dignified life have direct 
relevance for practice and the type of programs that are ethically acceptable. Fourth, 
punishment practices that fail to acknowledge the inherent dignity and entitlements of 
offenders are ethically unacceptable and ought to be rejected by practitioners. Fifth, 
strength based approaches are ethically more justified because of their commitment to 
offenders‟ entitlements and autonomy, alongside the interests of the community.  
First, intervention programs for offenders that focus primarily on risk reduction are 
ethically problematic because they are rooted almost entirely in the interests of the 
community and typically ignore the legitimate interests of offenders. Risk 
management initiatives such as civil commitment and community notification for sex 
offenders aim to protect the community from possible future sexual offences. 
Offenders, who after a systematic assessment are deemed to be high risk in many US 
jurisdictions, are committed to high security special hospitals indefinitely (Vess, 
2009). Sex offenders who are released from prison are often subject to severe 
geographical restrictions and also can have their identities and residential location 
made publicly available. A danger of such initiatives is that offenders experience 
stigmatization and find it extremely difficult to resume or start a normal life within the 
community.  An ethically more acceptable model would be to offer offenders social 
supports and the available resources to live personally meaningful and better lives. 
The fact that western criminal justice systems often refuse to do this does not make it 
ethically acceptable or suggest practitioners should simply accommodate to such 
practices. The main problem with risk management strategies such as those outlined 
above is that they leave offenders living marginal lives devoid of dignity and 
undermine their chances of reconciliation and redemption.  
Second, conflict between the rights of offenders and those of non offenders is 
inevitable and likely to revolve around the question of how best to balance their 
respective entitlements and obligations. Human rights are mechanisms designed to 
protect the core features of human functioning relating to well being and freedom. 
These two sets of conditions are important because when present they enable 
individuals to act in pursuit of valued goals and to live in dignified and mutually 
respectful ways. The critical issue to note is that aside from their role in enforcing 
personal entitlements, human rights also entail obligations to respect the core interests 
of other members of the community and to ensure that in any situation where 
competing interests are at stake, care is take to arrive at a balanced outcome. The need 
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to strive for social and ethical decisions that take the interests of all stakeholders into 
account is especially salient in the case of offenders where too often their claims for 
the various goods protected by human rights are casually dismissed (Ward & Birgden, 
2007). As stated above, risk management policies that place severe liberty restrictions 
upon offenders because of the possibility they may commit future offences represents 
such an ethical flashpoint (Vess, 2009). While victims of crimes and members of the 
community may have legitimate concerns about the potential of offenders to harm 
other people, it is all too easy to impose unnecessarily severe restrictions or sanctions 
on individuals in such cases. For example, it may be prudent to require newly released 
high risk sex offenders to notify police departments when moving into a new 
residential area but it is not clear why such knowledge should be made public. 
Furthermore, imprisonment conditions need to be secure enough to prevent escapes 
but ought not to remove offenders‟ privacy, well-being entitlements (e.g. adequate 
exercise, contact with families, right to work, leisure, etc.), and freedom of choice 
completely (Ward & Birgden, 2007). The concept of core entitlements logically 
entails threshold requirements below which individuals should not be allowed to fall. 
Furthermore, the aim ought to be to only remove or reduce access to primary goods 
when there is a compelling ethical reason (e.g., threat to others, necessary security) to 
do so. It should never be a default position that offenders‟ dignity is irrelevant and 
fundamental benefits provided only at the discretion of the state. Finally, it is well 
known that a considerable number of sex offenders have in the past been physically 
and sexually abused and that this abuse has resulted in significant psychological and 
social injuries (Ward & Moreton, 2008). To deny such individuals therapy because 
they are offenders and therefore have allegedly forfeited their treatment entitlements 
is ethically unfounded and pragmatically unwise (Ward & Moreton, 2008). In light of 
these considerations, I argue any restrictions on offenders‟ necessary agency 
conditions need to be carefully justified. Without such justifications, the recognition 
of the inherent dignity all people and subsequent mutual respect that ought to reside at 
the heart of a just criminal justice system, and the moral community it serves, will be 
unacceptably absent. 
Third, the two strands of the concept of dignity evident in my analysis have direct 
relevance for correctional programming and practice. Individual empowerment is 
basically concerned with the need to address agency and autonomy requirements in 
order to ensure offenders can actively participate in a life shaped by their own values 
and goals. The constraint stand of dignity sets out conditions within with such a life 
ought to be lived. First, the prudential aspect dictates that individuals need to have 
their basic needs for relationships, health, education, and nourishment met as without 
such goods their capacity to function in an autonomous (free) way would be severely 
compromised. Second, because dignity is inherent in all individuals, offenders are 
ethically unjustified in seeking to implement a life plan that harms other people. 
Therefore, intervention programs should strengthen offenders‟ abilities to function as 
moral agents and thus aim to equip them with coping skills such as self-regulation 
abilities, problem solving skills, and emotional competencies. All of these abilities are 
core targets of current correctional programs. In addition, well being orientated 
programs include social skills training, anger management, leisure, substance abuse 
interventions, and sexual health programs. Again, all of these types of interventions 
are currently offered to offenders. What my analysis indicates is that the concept of 
dignity and its attendant concerns of empowerment and constraints are arguably the 
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ethical foundation of correctional practices. An advantage of making this dependence 
more explicit is that such programs will become more integrated and also reduce the 
chances of the interests of both offenders and members of the community getting 
overlooked.  
Fourth, correctional practitioners ought to be aware of the punishment practices 
occurring in their institutions and also those contained within their own practice. If 
punishment is underpinned by an unacceptable ethical theory, one that violates the 
inherent dignity and associated rights of offenders, then practitioners have an ethical 
obligation to address such concerns. Problems are easier to deal with if they are 
external in my experience. When therapists or social workers are unreflectively 
engaged in punishment within an intervention program, they ought to immediately 
think about its ethical acceptability. An example of an unacceptable practice is when 
group workers consider it their responsibility to take a hard line with offenders and 
consistently challenge and harshly confront them.  Intervention practices like this are 
clearly punishment but without a legitimate justification, and are often erroneously 
construed as therapeutic practices. Such abusive behavior is neither acceptable 
therapy nor ethically justified punishment and should not to be engaged in. 
Sometimes a reason for overly harsh and untherapeutic behavior is that practitioners 
are so preoccupied with attempting to reduce offenders‟ risk that they fail to 
appreciate their rights and entitlements as well. These entitlements are grounded in 
their inherent dignity and their status as moral equals. 
Finally, an ethical advantage of strength based rehabilitation theories, such as the 
good lives model (GLM), is that that they seek to equip offenders with the resources 
to pursue their own visions of better lives while also being concerned to reduce risk 
for reoffending. Programs derived from rehabilitation theories like the GLM are able 
to achieve this because of an emphasis on individual agency and also the 
interconnectedness of all people. Therefore, any intervention plan that is guided by 
the assumptions of the GLM will be sensitive to risk factors while taking offenders‟ 
personal goals and aspirations seriously. The provision of the internal and external 
conditions required to implement offenders‟ plans of living will be undertaken in a 
way that also ensures individual and contextual risk elements are targeted. Because 
the GLM is an ecological model it is always a question of balancing the core, and 
sometimes competing, interests of all individuals rather than privileging the interests 
of the community at the expense of offenders. To do this is to effectively ignore the 
moral equality of offenders and therefore deny them recognition respect.  A notable 
feature of strength based programs is that they locate responsibility for crime 
prevention and management with the community as well as the individual offender. 
Conclusions 
Ethical thinking ought to be regarded as integral to the role of correctional 
practitioners and not simply an additional, slightly peripheral, consideration wrapped 
around the core business of assessment and program delivery.  I have argued that the 
concepts of human dignity and human rights are the ethical cornerstones of 
correctional practice and penetrate deeply into every facet of our work. Furthermore, 
it is the responsibility of individuals involved in the delivery of correctional programs 
to be aware of the punishment assumptions supporting practice and to reflect upon the 
adequacy of any justification given. I have argued that the only ethically defensible 
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view of punishment is a communicative one, largely because of its assertion that all 
the major actors involved in the criminal justice system are mutually accountable and 
have intrinsic value. The value of dignity demands that each person is treated with 
respect and is also responsive to others in a mutually sustaining manner. If 
practitioners keep in mind the intrinsic value of offenders and victims as they go 
about their various professional tasks, it is less likely they will act in ways that deny 
the inherent dignity of either.  
 
Email:  
tony.ward@vuw.ac.nz 
 
References 
Andrews, D. A., & Bonta, J. (2003). The Psychology of Criminal Conduct (3
rd
 ed.). 
Cincinnati, OH: Anderson. 
Bennett, C.  (2008).  The apology ritual: A philosophical theory of punishment.  
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Beyleveld, D., & Brownsword, R.  (2001). Human dignity in bioethics and law.  New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Boonin, D.  (2008). The problem of punishment.  New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Bush, S. S., Connell, M. A., & Denny, R. L.  (2006). Ethical practice in forensic 
psychology: A systematic model for decision making.  Washington, DC: 
American Psychological Association. 
Churchill, R. P.  (2006). Human rights and global diversity.  Upper Saddle River, NJ: 
Pearson Prentice Hall. 
Darwell, S.  (2006).   The second-person standpoint: Morality, respect, and 
accountability.  Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Donnelly, J.  (2003). Universal human rights in theory and practice-2
nd
 ed. London, 
UK: Cornell University Press. 
Driver, J.  (2006).  Ethics: The fundamentals.  Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing. 
Duff, R. A.  (2001).  Punishment, communication, and community.  New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press. 
Freeden, M.  (1991). Rights.  Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. 
Freeman, M.  (2002).  Human Rights.  Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. 
Gewirth, A.  (1981). Reason and morality.  Chicago, USA: The University of Chicago 
Press. 
 126 
 
 
Gewirth, A.  (1996). The community of rights.  Chicago, USA: The University of 
Chicago Press. 
Glaser, B.  (2003). „ Therapeutic Jurisprudence: An ethical paradigm for therapists in 
sex offender treatment programs.‟ Western Criminology Review, 4, 143-154.  
Griffin, J. (2008). On human rights.  Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Golash, D.  (2005).  The case against punishment: Retribution, crime prevention, and 
the law.  New York, NY: New York University Press. 
Haag, A. D.  (2006).  „Ethical dilemmas faced by correctional psychologists‟ in 
Canada.  Criminal Justice and Behavior, 33, 93-109. 
Kleinig, J.  (2008).  Ethics and criminal justice: An introduction.  Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Lazarus, L.  (2004). Contrasting prisoners’ rights: A comparative examination of 
England and Germany. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Levenson, J., & D‟Amora, D.  (2005).  „An ethical paradigm for sex offender 
treatment: Response to Glaser.‟  Western Criminology Review, 6, 145-153.  
Lippke, R. L.  (2002). „Toward a theory of prisoners‟ rights.‟ Ratio Juris, 15, 122-
145. 
Miller, D. (2007). National responsibility and global justice.  Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press.  
Miller, R. B.  (2004).  Facing human suffering: Psychology and psychotherapy as 
moral engagement.  Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. 
Morsink, J.  (2009).  Inherent human rights: Philosophical roots of the universal 
declaration.  Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
Nickel, J. W. (2007). Making sense of human rights-2
nd
 ed. Oxford, UK: Blackwell 
Publishing. 
Nussbaum, M. (2006). Frontiers of justice: disability, nationality, species-
membership. Cambridge, UK: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 
Orend, B.  (2002).  Human rights: Concept and context.  Ontario, Canada: Broadview 
Press. 
Shultziner, D.  (2007).  „Human dignity: Functions and meanings.‟ In J.  Malpas & N. 
Lickiss, (2007) (Eds.). Perspectives on human dignity: A conversation (pp 73-
92). Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer. 
Smit, D. Z. & Snacken, S.  (2009).  Principles of European prison law and policy: 
Penology and human rights.  New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Sulmasy, D. P.  (2007). „Human dignity and human worth.‟  In J.  Malpas & N. 
Lickiss, (2007) (Eds.). Perspectives on human dignity: A conversation (pp 9-
18). Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer. 
 127 
 
 
United Nations (1948). „Universal declaration of human rights.‟ In J. P. Martin & R. 
Rangaswamy, (1984) (Eds.).  Twenty-five human rights documents.  NY: 
Columbia University for the Study of Human Rights. 
Vess, J.  (2009). „Fear and loathing in public policy: Ethical issues in laws for sex 
offenders.‟  Aggression and Violent Behavior, 14, 264-272. 
Ward, T.  (in press).  „Extending the mind into the world: A new theory of cognitive 
distortions. „ Journal of Sexual Aggression. 
Ward, T., & Birgden, A. (2007). „Human rights and correctional clinical practice.„ 
Aggression and Violent Behavior, 12, 628-643. 
Ward, T. & Langlands, R.  (2009).  „Repairing the rupture: Restorative justice and 
offender rehabilitation.‟  Aggression and Violent Behavior, 14, 205-214. 
Ward, T., & Maruna, S. (2007). Rehabilitation: Beyond the risk paradigm. London: 
Routledge.  
Ward, T & Moreton, G. (2008). „Moral Repair with Offenders: Ethical Issues Arising 
From Victimization Experiences.‟ Sexual Abuse: A Journal of Research and 
Treatment, 20, 305-322. 
Ward, T., & Nee, C. (2009). „Surfaces and depths: Evaluating the theoretical 
assumptions of the cognitive skills programmes‟. Psychology, Crime & Law, 
15, 165-182.  
Ward, T. & Salmon, K.  (2009).  „The ethics of punishment: Correctional practice 
implications.‟ Aggression and Violent Behavior, 14, 239-247. 
 
